We all know this, but it is still sobering to see it laid out formally. The conclusions that can be drawn from most neuroscientific data is often simply that some correlation exists between two observations or conditions.
The Covering-Law Model One way to strengthen representational models would be to place restrictions on what can appear in explanatory representations and on how the representation can be applied to the explanandum phenomenon. One might reasonably wonder at this point how the value of unity is to be weighed against the value of generating explanations that satisfy constraints such as E1 — E5. In electrophysiology, as discussed in Chapter 2, explanations appeal to the movement of charges and matter across the membrane. See Collins et. More importantly, however, this axiom seems to be inconsistent with the second axiom of composition, which states that in one experience, we can have varied conceptual content, e.
However, when striving for more mechanistic conclusions, we invoke the concept of causality, looking for the identity and order of the cogs in the machine. In neuroscience, observed phenomena are usually multifactorial, difficult to isolate, and embedded in a complex system that is poorly understood in general, so the establishment of mechanistic causality is especially tricky. Point 2: Filler terms.
He notes that while we are all trying to be as rigorous as we can about our conclusions, the line between what we have actually shown and what is merely suggested by our data is often blurry, largely due to the complexity of underlying mechanisms in neuroscience, as noted above. Point 3: The mosaic unity of neuroscience.
This term, which is described in Chapter 7 and is part of the subtitle of the book, is meant to describe the idea that the brain simply has too many layers of complexity for us to expect to find a compact set of explanatory mechanisms that describe how it works. Unlike many other areas of science, which search for compact goals by nature eg high energy physics , Craver suggests that perhaps the brain is destined to be explained by a layered mosaic of pieces that cumulatively constrain the set of possible mechanisms, rather than a grand unified theory.
This viewpoint is illustrated in the context of the relationship between the macroscopic phenomena of learning and memory, and the neuron scale phenomenon of long term potentiation. As a staunch reductionist , my personal bias is that this is giving up too soon, and that we should be applying heroic and concerted efforts to force things to become simpler. Eric Wong did a PhD in Biophysics at the Medical College of Wisconsin, working on gradient coil design, fast imaging, and perfusion imaging.
Explaining the brain by Carl F Craver Book 1 edition published in in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide. The making of a memory mechanism by Carl F Craver 1 edition published in in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide.
Mechanisms and emergence a reply to Denis C. No evidence of risk-taking or impulsive behaviour in a person with episodic amnesia: Implications for the role of the hippocampus in future-regarding decision-making 1 edition published in in English and held by 1 WorldCat member library worldwide Abstract : Does advantageous decision-making require one to explicitly remember the outcome of a series of past decisions or to imagine future personal consequences of one's choices?
Findings that amnesic people with hippocampal damage cannot form a clear preference for advantageous decks over many learning trials on the Iowa Gambling Task IGT have been taken to suggest that complex decision-making on the IGT depends on declarative episodic memory and hippocampal integrity.
"There have been pockets of activity, I would say, but few systematic accounts that explore the field of neuroscience as a whole. Carl Craver's book Explaining. What distinguishes good explanations in neuroscience from bad? neuroscientific explanations are: descriptions of multilevel mechanisms.
We tested this possibility in the amnesic individual K. He also did not display impulsive or risk-taking behaviour on the TGT, despite a profound inability to imagine personal future experiences. These findings suggest that impaired decision-making on the IGT in amnesia is unlikely to reflect a predilection to act in the moment or failure to take future consequences into account.
Instead, some forms of future-regarding decision-making may be dissociable, with performance on tasks relying on declarative learning or on episodic-constructive processes more likely to be impaired. Audience Level.
Related Identities. Associated Subjects. Craver, C. English 52 Polish 1. Project Page Feedback Known Problems.